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Abstract. Especially in the Big Data era, the usage of different clas-
sification methods is increasing day by day. The success of these classi-
fication methods depends on the effectiveness of learning methods. Ex-
treme learning machine (ELM) classification algorithm is a relatively new
learning method built on feed-forward neural-network. ELM classifica-
tion algorithm is a simple and fast method that can create a model from
high-dimensional data sets. Traditional ELM learning algorithm implic-
itly assumes complete access to whole data set. This is a major privacy
concern in most of cases. Sharing of private data (i.e. medical records) is
prevented because of security concerns. In this research, we propose an
efficient and secure privacy-preserving learning algorithm for ELM clas-
sification over data that is vertically partitioned among several parties.
The new learning method preserves the privacy on numerical attributes,
builds a classification model without sharing private data without dis-
closing the data of each party to others.
Keywords: extreme learning machine, privacy preserving data analysis,
secure multi-party computation
1 Introduction
The main purpose of machine learning can be expressed as to find the patterns
and summarize the data form of high-dimensional data sets. The classification
algorithms [1,2] is one of the most widely used method of machine learning in
real-life problems. Data sets used in real-life problems are high dimensional as a
result, analysis of them is a complicated process.
Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) was proposed by [3] based on generalized
Single-hidden Layer Feed-forward Networks (SLFNs). Main characteristics of
ELM are small training time compared to traditional gradient-based learning
methods, high generalization property on predicting unseen examples with multi-
class labels and parameter free with randomly generated hidden nodes.
Background knowledge attack uses quasi-identifier attributes of a dataset
and reduce the possible values of output sensitive information. A well-known
example about background knowledge attack is the personal health information
about of Massachusetts governor William Weld using a anonymized data set
[4]. In order to overcome these types of attacks, various anonymization methods
have been developed like k -anonymity [4], l -diversity [5], t -closeness [6].
Although the anonymization methods are applied to data sets to protect
sensitive data, though, the sensitive data is still accessed by an attacker in various
ways [7]. Also, data anonymization methods are not applicable in some cases.
In another scenario, consider the situation when two or more hospitals wants
to analyze patient data [8] through collaborative processes that require using
each other’s databases. In such cases, it is necessary to find a secure training
method that can run jointly on private union databases, without revealing or
pooling their sensitive data. Privacy-preserving ELM learning systems are one
of the methods that the only information learned by the different parties is the
output model of learning method.
In this research, we propose a privacy-preserving ELM training model that
constructs the global ELM classification model from the distributed data sets
in multiple parties. The training data set is vertically partitioned among the
parties, and the final distributed model is constructed at an independent party
to securely predict the correct label for the new input data.
The content of this paper is as follows: Related work is reviewed in Section
2. In Section 3, ELM, secure multi-party computation and the secure addition
are explained. In section 4, our new privacy-preserving ELM for vertically par-
titioned data is proposed. Section 5 emprically shows the timing results of our
method with different public data sets.
2 Related Works
In this section, we review the existing works that have been developed for dif-
ferent machine learning methods. The major differences between our learning
model and existing work are highlighted.
Recently, there has been significant contributions in privacy-preserving ma-
chine learning. Secretans et al. [9] presents a probabilistic neural network (PNN)
model. The PNN is an approximation of the theoretically optimal classifier,
known as the Bayesian optimal classifier. There are at least three parties in-
volved in the computation of the secure matrix summation to add the partial
class conditional probability vectors together. Aggarwal et al. [10] developed con-
densation based learning method. They show that an anonymized data closely
matches the characteristics of the original data. Samet et al. [11] present new
privacy-preserving protocols for both the back-propagation and ELM algorithms
among several parties. The protocols are presented for perceptron learning algo-
rithm and applied only single layer models. Oliveria et al. [12] proposed methods
distort confidential numerical features to protect privacy for clustering analysis.
Guang et al. [13] proposed a privacy-preserving back-propagation algorithm for
horizontally partitioned databases for multi-party case. They use secure sum in
their protocols. Yu et al. [14] proposed a privacy-preserving solution for support
vector machine classification. Their approach constructs the global SVM classi-
fication model from the data distributed at multiple parties, without disclosing
the data of each party to others.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce preliminary knowledge of ELM, secure multi-party
computation and secure addition briefly.
3.1 Extreme learning machine
ELM was originally proposed for the single-hidden layer feed-forward neural net-
works [15,16,3] . Then, ELM was extended to the generalized single-hidden layer
feed-forward networks where the hidden layer may not be neuron like [17,18].
Main advantages of ELM classification algorithm is that ELM can be trained
hundred times faster than traditional neural network or support vector machine
algorithm since its input weights and hidden node biases are randomly created
and output layer weights can be analytically calculated by using a least-squares
method [19,20]. The most noticeable feature of ELM is that its hidden layer
parameters are selected randomly.
Given a set of training data D = {(xi, yi) | i = 1, ..., n},xi ∈ R
p, yi ∈
{1, 2, ...,K}} sampled independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from
some unknown distribution. The goal of a neural network is to learn a func-
tion f : X → Y where X is instances and Y is the set of all possible labels. The
output label of an single hidden-layer feed-forward neural networks (SLFNs)
with N hidden nodes can be described as
fN (x) =
N∑
i=1
βiG(ai, bi,x), x ∈ R
n, ai ∈ R
n (1)
where ai and bi are the learning parameters of hidden nodes and βi is the weight
connecting the ith hidden node to the output node. The output function of ELM
for generalized SLFNs can be identified by
fN (x) =
N∑
i=1
βiG(ai, bi,x) = β × h(x) (2)
For the binary classification applications, the decision function of ELM becomes
fN(x) = sign
(
N∑
i=1
βiG(ai, bi,x)
)
= sign (β × h(x)) (3)
Equation 2 can be written in another form as
Hβ = T (4)
H and T are respectively hidden layer matrix and output matrix.
β = H†T (5)
H† is the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse of matrix H. Hidden layer matrix
can be described as
H(a˜, b˜, x˜) =


G(a1, b1, x1) · · · G(aL, bL, x1)
...
. . .
...
G(a1, b1, xN ) · · · G(aL, bL, xN )


N×L
(6)
where a˜ = a1, ..., aL, b˜ = b1, ..., bL, x˜ = x1, ..., xN . Output matrix can be de-
scribed as
T =
[
t1 . . . tN
]T
(7)
The hidden nodes of SLFNs can be randomly generated. They can be indepen-
dent of the training data.
3.2 Secure Multi Party Computation
In vertically partitioned data, each party holds different attributes of same data
set. Let’s have n input instances, D = {(xi, yi) | xi ∈ R
p, yi ∈ R}
n
i=1. The parti-
tion strategy is shown in Figure 1.
Secure Multi-Party Addition In secure multi-party addition (SMA), each
party, Pi, has a private local value, xi. At the end of the computation, we obtain
the sum, x =
∑k−1
i=0 . For this works, we applied the Yu et al. [21] secure addition
procedure. Their approach is a generalization of the existing works [22] that uses
secure communication and trusted party. Canonical order based , P0, · · · , Pk−1,
protocol is applied. The SMA method is show in Algorithm 1. This protocol
calculates the required sum in secure manner.
Algorithm 1 Secure multi-party addition
1: procedure SMA(P)
2: P0 : R← rand(F) ⊲ P0 randomly chooses a number R
3: V ← R + x0 mod F
4: P0 sends V to node P1
5: for i = 1, · · · , k − 1 do
6: Pi receives V = R +
∑i−1
j=0
xj mod F
7: Pi computes V =
(
R +
∑i
j=1
xj mod F
)
= ((xi + V ) mod F)
8: Pi sends V to node Pi+1
9: end for
10: P0 : V ← (V −R) = (V −R mod F) ⊲ Actual addition result
11: end procedure
x1,1 · · · x1,t−1 · · · x1,t · · · x1,k
x2,1 · · · x2,t−1 · · · x2,t · · · x2,k
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
xm,1 · · · xm,t−1 · · · xm,t · · · xm,k




P1 · · · Pk
D =
Fig. 1: Vertically partitioned data set D.
4 Privacy-preserving ELM over vertically partitioned
data
The data set that one wants to find a classifier for consists of m instances in
n-dimensional space is shown with D ∈ Rm×n. Each instances of the data set
has values for n features. Matrix D is vertically partitioned into i parties of
P0, P1, · · · , Pi and each features of instances owned by a party that is private
shown as Figure 1 illustrates. As shown in Equation 6, at second stage of ELM
learning, hidden layer output matrix, H is calculated using randomly assigned
hidden node parameters w, b and β. ELM calculates the matrix H and output
weight vector, β, is obtained by multiplying H and T. Each member of H is
computed with an activation function g such that G(wi,xi, bi) = g(xi ·wi + bi)
for sigmoid or G(wi,xi, bi) = g(bi − ||xi −wi||) for radial based functions. An
(i, j)th element of H is
G(wi,xi, bi) = sign(xi ·wi + bi) (8)
where xi is the ith instances of data set and wi is hidden node input weight of
ith instance and xi,wi ∈ R
n.
Let x1i , · · ·x
k
i be vertically partitioned vectors of input instance xi andw
1
j , · · ·w
k
j
be vertically partitioned vectors of jth hidden node input weight wj , b
0
j , · · · , b
k
j
be jth node input bias over k different parties. Then the output of jth input
node with ith instance of input data set using k sites is
sign(xi ·wj + bj) = sign
((
x0i ·w
0
j + b
0
j) + · · ·+ (x
k
j ·w
k
j + b
k
j
))
(9)
From Equation 9, calculation of hidden layer output matrix, H can be decom-
posed into k different parties using secure sum of matrices, such that
H = sign (T1 + · · ·+Tk) (10)
where
Ti =


(
xi1 ·w
i
1 + b
i
1
)
· · ·
(
xi1 ·w
i
L + b
i
L
)
...
. . .
...(
xiN ·w
i
1 + b
i
1
)
· · ·
(
xiL ·w
i
N + b
i
N
)


N×L
(11)
Privacy Preserving ELM Algorithm Let D ∈ RM×N , and the number of
input layer size be L, the number of parties be k, then the our training model
becomes:
1. Master party creates weight matrix, W ∈ RL×N
2. Master party distributes partition W with same feature size for each parties.
3. Party P0 creates a random matrix, R =


rand1,1(F) · · · rand1,L(F)
...
. . .
...
randN,1(F) · · · randN,L(F)


N×L
4. Party P0 creates perturbated output,V = R+


(
x01 ·w
0
1 + b
0
1
)
· · ·
(
x01 ·w
0
L + b
0
L
)
...
. . .
...(
x0N ·w
0
1 + b
0
1
)
· · ·
(
x0N ·w
0
L + b
0
L
)


5. for i = 1, · · · , k − 1
– Pi computes V = V +


(
xi1 ·w
i
1 + b
i
1
)
· · ·
(
xi1 ·w
i
L + b
i
L
)
...
. . .
...(
xiN ·w
i
1 + b
i
1
)
· · ·
(
xiL ·w
i
N + b
i
N
)


– Pi sends V to Pi+1
6. P0 subtracts random matrix, R, from the received matrix V. H = (V −R)
mod F
7. Hidden layer node weight vector, β, is calculated. β = H† ·T
5 Experiments
In this section, we perform experiments on real-world data sets from the public
available data set repositories. Public data sets are used to evaluate the pro-
posed learning method. Classification models of each data set are compared for
accuracy results without using secure multi-party computation.
Experimental setup : In this section, our approach is applied to six different
data sets to verify model affectivity and efficiency. The data sets are summarized
in Table 1, including australian, colon-cancer, diabetes, duke, heart, ionosphere.
For each data set in Table 1, we vary number of party size, k from 2 to number
Table 1: Description of the testing data sets used in the experiments.
Data set #Train #Classes #Attributes
australian [23] 690 2 14
colon-cancer [24] 62 2 2,000
diabetes [25] 768 2 8
duke breast cancer [26] 44 2 7,129
heart [27] 270 2 13
ionosphere [28] 351 2 34
of feature, n, of the data set. For instance, when our party size is three, k = 3,
and attribute size fourteen, n = 14, then the first two party have 5 attributes,
and last party has 4 attributes.
Simulation Results: The accuracy of secure multi-party computation based
ELM is exactly same for the traditional ELM training algorithm. Figure 2 shows
results of our simulations. As shown in figure, time scale becomes its steady state
position when number of parties, k, moves closer to number of attributes, k.
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Fig. 2: Vertically partitioned data set D.
6 Conclusion and Future Works
ELM learning algorithm, a new method compared to other classification algo-
rithms. ELM outperforms traditional Single Layer Feed-forward Neural-networks
and Support Vector Machines for big data [29]. The ELM is applied in many
fields. Almost, in all fields that ELM is applied (i.e. medical records, business,
government), privacy is a major concern.
A new privacy-preserving learning model is proposed for ELM in vertically
partitioned data in multi-party partitioning without sharing the data of each site
to the others. In order to save the privacy of input data set, master party divides
weight vector, and each party calculates the activation function result with its
data and weight vector. Extending the privacy-preserving ELM to horizontally
distributed data set is a future work for this approach.
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